The comic above highlights many of the negative side effects of globalization; jobs go abroad where the price of labor is cheap, and US plants go out of business. The people in Vietnam and Indonesia are making literal pennies to the dollar that US workers would be making, and it is forcing jobs out of the States. Globalization, and the globalization of trade need serious reforms, especially when it comes to human rights and equal pay across the globe. However, globalization does have positive effects.
To put a twist on the old adage, states that trade together, stay together. The trade relationship that is being developed between the two nations allows for them to build a relationship that will go further then trade, there is the potential to develop a deep rooted peace between the two nations because the economic benefits of remaining allies outweighs the potential benefits of war. There is a theory known as the Golden Arch Theory, and it argues that any two countries who have a McDonalds within their borders will not go to war. This has held true with only one exception: the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The peace that can be built from the furthering of trade has contributed to this being the most peaceful time in history.
The globalization of jobs has also allowed for countries to experience a specialization of their markets in high paying, innovative jobs. Meaning, the more a country like the US sends jobs abroad, the further chance the US has to advance their specialization in jobs that pay more. This hurts the economy and the perception of globalization for a several decades as the economy takes time to adjust to the change in market demands. However, this can allow the country to make more money as well as make more technological advances.
According to this article, although women's role are greatly expanding, and culture and politics are revolving, too many men aren not taking part in this transformation. The author argues that white men have been the dominant group throughout American history. Everyone else compares themselves to experiences and norms of white males, because they had the power and control in the system that that was created. This also relates to Tickner's critique against nationalism. She argues that throughout history, it was men who made decisions on behave of the states, and so explaining states behavior is really looking at the behavior and rationale of men. Additionally, states will try to maximize power, and this ends up benefiting men the most. But this system has been challenged, and the women's rights movement has been able to break down some of the social and legal barriers that women face. Filipovic says that the world is changing around men, but they are stuck in the past. One reason why is because the male identity is still closely tied to "dominance and earning potential", and this is what Trump appeals to. Trump appeals to white men who are struggling, and they see him as someone who can help give them their identities back.
We can see how this connects to the Tickner reading, which points out that liberalism is based in the behavior of Western masculinity. Competitive markets are set up in a way that favors jobs that are seen as more masculine, which seem to pay more and come with more power. As opposed to jobs such as teachers or social work jobs, which more are seen as more feminine and pay less. The NY Times article says that Although women are in the workforce more then ever before, they rarely ascend to the highest ranks. When women are in more masculine positions, they face the struggle of being perceived as a "nice bimbo" or a "competent bitch". The norm is that females should be more feminine, if they have more masculine qualities and are in a position where they have a lot of power, they may be seen as a bitchy if they assert this power or dominance.
Tickner believes that to reach economic justice, we have to help women get their own autonomy and participation in the economy. It is important to make sure that we don't just associate power with political power and dominating others, but with things such as potential of people and energy capacity. According to Tickner, It is important to move away from the Western dichotomies of masculinity and feminity. A similar argument is made by Filipovic, who says that a move toward gender equality and a further breakdown of the stereotypes that men have to be masculine, and females have to be feminine. This would allow individuals to focus doing things they're good at, and not just what they are expected to do. She believes that for a lot of men, fewer cultural rules about how men should be and act, would be a better America for them to live in as well. It isn't clear that a Women President would help to make female power normalized, or close the gaps between men and women. What is clear that this election has shed even more light onto this issue and has gotten more people involved in this conversation about a shift towards equality for men and women.
Filipovic, Jill. "The Men Feminists Left Behind." The New York Times. The New York Times, 05 Nov. 2016. Web. 04 Dec. 2016.
Tickner, J. Ann. "On The Fringes of the World Economy." A Feminist Voyage through International Relations (2014): 36-49. Web.
Many U.S. Businesses Struggle to Find Mexican Workers
11/24/2016 10:35AM
Video/Photo: Jake Nicol/The Wall Street Journal
This video discusses the challenges facing Joe Hargrave, a restaurateur in the San Francisco area. Recently Hargrave has been unable to find workers. The video postulates this is due to the fact that fewer Mexicans are migrating to the United States. Unlike President Elect Trump Hargrave is more concerned with how to get immigrants into the United States than how to keep them out. "Mexican labor has been the backbone of US industries like hospitality, construction, and agriculture for decades." The author believes this decline is due to smaller families and higher education which allows Mexicans to find jobs at home. Smaller families also means fewer "potential migrants". Campaigns discouraging illegal immigration may also play a role in the decreased number of migrants. Smugglers are also charging more for the journey.
Around 6 in 10 undocumented immigrants work in low-level jobs like construction, service, and production, twice that of US born workers (Pew Research Center). Although, Trump argues there are too many illegal immigrants in the U.S. employers like Hargrave need workers for positions native born people are uninterested in filling. help their business succeed. The Bureau of Labor Statistics noted that in May there were 700,000 vacant restaurant and hotel positions. Around 100,000 immigrants still cross the border annually but some immigrants are choosing to voluntarily return to Mexico. The video concludes with Hargrave saying he is going to hire a recruiter and develop an HR department to help his Taco business.
Personally, this video was interesting as it presented a side of immigration which I had never considered. Evidently immigration has been crucial for business owners like Hargrave in the past. It will be interesting to see what will occur in the future after Trump takes office. Although, the impacts of immigration are more difficult to see in Massachusetts they are nonetheless present. Perhaps Congress should consider the important roll immigrants have held in the past-especially in America's service, construction, and agricultural sectors. America's population is aging; it is evident that legal immigration reform is necessary and perhaps it would be wise to ease the laws surrounding immigration to support economic prosperity.
Thanks for reading; hope you enjoyed Thanksgiving break!
After looking at these two cartoons and then the link that was within the Green IPE slides, I believe all three fit very well together. The Paris Agreement is certainly a big step in the right direction. It's a little bit more reassuring due to all parties being in agreement with it, especially the three biggest emitters, U.S., EU, and China. This of course appears to be a step up, due to this overall agreement, from the Kyoto Protocol and Copenhagen Climate Change Conference, which both went no where due to lack of cooperation by mostly the U.S. and China. Although, within the Paris Agreement, there are actually no legally binding provisions on the emissions. It is all voluntary, which is a pretty idealistic in terms of members actually complying to the provisions even though it might slow their economic growth. There are a few members within this Paris Agreement, including the U.S., that are proven to not always do what is right in the face of compromising their economic footprint.
Along with this, this agreement is using a "bottom-up" approach which is essentially relying on the member's political mobility within their own nation's borders to make a change in complying with the proper number of emissions that are allowed to be released in order to stay under the 2 degrees Celsius goal. There are issues within this particular part of the agreement because once again it isn't legally enforcing climate change protocols. Another issue, is that this portion implies that emissions stay within borders, which of course is not the case. Within the agreement they do emphasize on the differences between different countries emitting levels, but it does not enforce a differential index, like Kyoto did, of the division in emissions between developed and developing nations. As a last note, the goal of staying under or at 2 degrees Celsius is not really a promising goal, considering the amount we still will be losing to global warming within that range. Although, it is a goal nonetheless, which is better than no preventative global warming goals. It's just that when one actually looks at the agreement, it appears to be more of a fabricated fluffy agreement that actually makes not promises or assurances. It seems to just be trying to act as an idealistic reassuring measure for that polar bear above, when in actuality it is on the road to making no significant changes and will end up under water like the other two climate initiatives. This is a very pessimistic view of the agreement so please offer any disagreements with my position. Thank you!
Recently, The Economist, attempted to explain what may happen to environmental policies during Trump's presidency. The article referenced the United Nation's Paris Agreement we discussed in class. The Agreement went into effect on November 4th of this year; thus far 193 nations have adopted it. However, Barack Obama only committed to the plan using his "executive authority", which could easily be abandoned by Mr. Trump. Withdrawing from the agreement would technically take four years, unless Mr. Trump withdrew the United States from the framework UN convention under which the Paris Agreement appeared would take about a year. However, this is not ideal as it would "set a poor example for other countries." Despite Mr. Trump's support of coal, the author believes it will not be viable due to the glut of fossil fuels in recent years. Mr. Trump can also not expand defend coal and deteriorate America's air and water quality. The Environmental Protection Agency will continue to enforce laws which were previously established. The influence of Green groups should also not be underestimated in our nation's environmental policies. Regardless of what happens during the Trump administration "2016 is set to be the hottest year ever recorded."
Many younger Americans are concerned with global warming, yet it is a phenomena which is difficult to curb as it requires international cooperation. As the article mentions, the Paris Agreement does not outline how nations should best meet their obligation to lessen the negative results of global warming. This is like because members of the United Nations recognize and value national sovereignty. Even if the nations were obligated to adhere to certain environmental goals or face some kind of consequence this could heighten tensions; few want to fuel conflict between the United States and China.
Unlike terrorism global warming is an issue which is largely unseen by the average American or European Union citizen. These nations' political clout far outweighs developing nations yet they are the least effected by environmental degradation. Without visible problems it is more challenging to achieve collective action. Certainly, we can each do our "part" but Mr. Trump's administration must recognize that global warming is an issue which Americans take seriously. If he wishes to be reelected Trump may have to consider their voice and opinions as well and reconsider the promises he made during his campaign to "rip up the Paris agreement" and eliminate America's Clean Power Plan.
Thanks for reading! Looking forward to hearing what you guys think!
http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21709218-new-numbers-imf-tell-tale-two-africas-african-economies-are-growing The Economist " African economies are growing at very
different speeds" -Oct 29th, 2016
In
sub-Saharan African countries, economic growth varies as you look at different
regions. In Nigeria is currently experiencing a recession, but the Ivory Coast
is experiencing an 8% growth rate. One of the main dividing factors
contributing to this difference in growth is resources. As the prices of different
materials decrease, countries that export these materials and resources are
getting less money for them. Angola (rich in oil and one of the fastest growing
countries in Africa) will not grow at all this year, because oil prices are
lower. Commodities that are exported to China from these African countries have
halved in value in 2015. Countries that don’t rely on exporting resources to
grow the economy will grow at 5.6% this year according to the IMF. The
lesson is that countries shouldn’t rely on commodities as their only source for
economic growth, it is important to diversify. The article uses the example of
East African Countries, which have created mobile banking applications to help
them sell oil and gas. But it is important that these countries don’t rely soil
on these resources. In the example of
Angola, dropping of oil prices lowers the growth that the country sees from
exporting this commodity.
These
governments don’t have control to set commodity prices. To compensate for the
drop in commodity prices, Nigeria tried to higher its exchange rate, which
ended up hurting their economy. Countries such as Ethiopia and Malawi, which
rely on agricultural exports for income, are experiencing a drought.This relates back to our reading by Ferraro
which suggests that countries such as Ethiopia and Malawa, who make most of
their money on agricultural exports, should make sure they can feed the people
in their own country before exporting this good. If they are going through
drought, what little crop they do produce should go to feeding themselves. Many
of these countries have high rates of malnutrition even though they export
great amounts of food. Dependency theorists would say that they should use the
food produced to feed themselves first and find other ways to integrate into
the global economy.
According
to the article, growth in South Africa has slowed to almost zero. But the
problem with the projected economic growth in these countries is that it is
hard for the IMF to make these calculations, and determine how people will be
affected by economic growth or decline.Ferraro also brings up the point that
most citizens in a country may not benefit from the economic activity that is
measured. Other aspects should be measured “such as life expectancy, literacy,
infant mortality, education, and the like.” (Ferraro) The IMF and the World
Bank often overlook social, political, and cultural factors. All of these
factors contribute to the economic state of these countries, and they should
all be considered when figuring out which ways will help improve their economic
situations the best.
According
to the dependency theory, states should try to be self-reliant. In contrast to
recommendations from the IMF and the World Bank, dependency theorist think that
states should try to be more self-reliant. Greater integration into the global
economy doesn’t mean it will help the economy in these countries grow. This can
be seen in African countries which aren’t seeing economic growth, trying to
integrate them into the world economic system we have in place which revolved
around Western and Capitalist systems does not seem like the best solution to do
so. It is important that underdeveloped countries have a balance between
self-reliance and economic interactions with the world economy. They should
support interactions that help them to improve their social and economic
wellbeing (which seems difficult to do in a existing system that revolves
around developed countries).
Vincent Ferraro, "Dependency Theory: An
Introduction," in The Development Economics Reader, ed. Giorgio
Secondi (London: Routledge, 2008), pp. 58-64
As one can guess from the title Walter Mead advocates for a more realist Europe. Mr. Mead claims that Europe needs to recognize the conditions which gave rise to international cooperation after WWII. He rejects the idea of a "cosmopolitan superstate" and advocates instead competition and military buildup. He notes the failure of European institutions to manage immigration, navigate their relationship with Russia, and regulate the economy. Mead believes geopolitical tensions which arose as the EU and NATO expanded were a result of democratic idealism and ultimately "threatened Russia's historic interests." He suggests stiff resistance to Russia coupled with communication. Mead also glorifies the nation-state and questions the legitimacy of pursuing a "pan-European superstate." Ultimately, Mead calls for the development of "hard power" and calls for a "decentralized and outward looking" European Union.
This article seemed relevant to our recent discussion of Karl Marx and different governmental systems. I enjoyed reading this article as it exhibited a solidly realist perspective. Although, it is a bit long and definitively conservative I thought it presented an interesting point of view and related to the definition of realism we discussed in class. Mead's call for realism and his condemnation of
"the papier-mache facade of power that the bureaucrats and jurists have labored so industriously, but so vainly, to build in Brussels" presented a unique perspective. It reminded me of our conversation about whether or not globalization was A. Prominent and B. Beneficial. Personally enjoyed his diction and thought the article was engaging.
Hope you are all having a great week!
-Hattie
Europe Needs Its Realist Past
The founders of the European Union were hardheaded pragmatists—and their wisdom could help today’s leaders handle Putin, migration and Brexit
ILLUSTRATION: LINCOLN AGNEW
By
WALTER RUSSELL MEAD
As Europe’s troubles deepen and pose more of a threat to the vital interests of the U.S., Americans are recycling their tried and tested critiques of the European Union: It is too statist and bureaucratic. Its instincts are too protectionist. Its decision-making bodies are too slow and secretive. EU foreign policy is too naive, too feckless about defense and security. The problem with Europe, in a word, is that it is too European.
But the EU isn’t in trouble today because its leaders are “too European.” The EU is in trouble because its leadership isn’t European enough. It is time for the continent to return to the tradition of realist politics that gave rise to its modern union in the first place.
It is easy today to forget just how hardheaded the original architects of Europe’s postwar drive for integration actually were. Charles de Gaulle of France, Konrad Adenauer of West Germany and Alcide De Gasperi of Italy were conservative nationalists whose vision for Europe reflected the bitter experiences of two world wars and a failed peace.
In its origins, European unity was an unsentimental exercise in geopolitics. Germany and Italy saw it as a way to reintegrate into the world after the disaster of fascism. France saw a coalition with a defeated and partitioned Germany as a way to cement its power in Europe and to strengthen its global reach. All these governments saw European unity as a way to keep the Old World as independent as possible from both Moscow and Washington. “Europe will be your revenge,” Adenauer told de Gaulle after the humiliation of the Suez crisis in 1956, when the U.S. forced France and Britain to back down from a joint campaign with Israel against Egypt.
These leaders did not think that submerging their national histories and identities in a cosmopolitan, post-national Europe was either possible or desirable. They supported Europe because it seemed to be the best way forward for the peoples they led. For its part, the U.S. backed the project because a united Western Europe offered the best hope to stop communism in the short term and to prevent the recurrence of major European wars farther down the road.
It was a farseeing generation of European leaders, and their insights proved to be right. A stronger, more united Europe kept the Soviets at bay (and limited American power) while serving the national interests of the nations who founded it.
But none of these leaders thought that they were building—or wanted to build—a cosmopolitan superstate, the aspiration of many Europeans today. And each of them was deeply concerned about building up his own military forces (including, in de Gaulle’s case, nuclear weapons). The Soviet threat kept European minds concentrated on the hard facts of power.
Even after the passing of postwar Europe’s founding generation, hard power and hard thinking still played a role in the continent’s politics. West German Chancellor Willy Brandt’s embrace of Ostpolitik—that is, an “eastern policy”—in the 1970s was a classic example of subtle and visionary statesmanship. It entailed, among things, the opening of the Warsaw Pact and the U.S.S.R. to trade and exchanges with West Germany, thus helping to weaken Soviet power, undermine the East German Communist Party and shift Eastern European economies and societies toward the West. During the 1980s, two German chancellors— Helmut Schmidt and Helmut Kohl—resisted immense public pressure in order to back President Ronald Reagan on the deployment of short-range nuclear missiles to counter the Soviet buildup.
Europe’s distinctive history—of powerful, competitive states developing a common civilization—gave the continent a complex and subtle tradition of statecraft. That tradition provided de Gaulle, Adenauer and their peers with the political ideas and diplomatic skills to achieve their goals.
U.S. President Ronald Reagan and West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl pose for photographers after talks at Winfield House, London, June 7, 1984. PHOTO: RON EDMONDS/ASSOCIATED PRESS
European statesmen of this era scoffed at American optimists like Eleanor Roosevelt,with her postwar confidence in the swift approach of a terrestrial utopia regulated by international law. They chided such naifs for their superficial approach to world politics—for neglecting the realities of hard power, on the one hand, and for dismissing the fateful and decisive influence of national culture, on the other.
Since the end of the Cold War, these traditions of statesmanship have faded, and the continent that gave Machiavelli to the world has embraced instead the spirit of Woodrow Wilson. When Wilson proposed his Fourteen Points after World War I, the French Premier Georges Clémenceau mocked them, noting that “God himself had only 10.” Today, however, Wilson’s vision of a liberal world order regulated by global institutions has become the basis of European policy.
It isn’t working, and the EU is in the midst of its most serious crisis in a half-century. Beset by enemies abroad and rivalries within, buffeted by economic and cultural forces that its feeble institutions cannot master, riven by clashes of interest and values that pit north against south, east against west, the EU is being tested as never before.
To overcome these problems, Europe needs to return to its roots and recover the realistic statecraft for which it was once celebrated and esteemed.
The recovery must begin with geopolitics. With the demise of the Soviet Union, Europe’s leaders no longer saw themselves as building fragile structures of order in a dangerous world of rival powers. To their minds, the age of universal peace had come. For reasons of democratic idealism and European solidarity, they promoted the expansion of the EU into former areas of the Warsaw Pact and the U.S.S.R. But in the excitement of building a larger EU, few of them considered how these policies would affect the continent’s relationship to Russia.
De Gaulle or Adenauer would have known better. Since the time of Peter the Great, Russia has insisted on its right to influence key European decisions that affect its own economic and security interests. Any European leader of the last three centuries would have understood, without being told, that to attempt to exclude Russia from the most important economic and political questions in Europe was to invite war.
For the clueless technocrats who made European policy in the 1990s, however, Russia was inconsequential—economically moribund, still stunned by the Soviet collapse and ruled by the increasingly pitiable (and often drunk) Boris Yeltsin. Russia, they assumed, could do little more than protest against EU and NATO expansion in the 1990s. But stunned isn’t dead, and the inevitable Russian recovery began.
Russia is not (yet) the kind of power that the Soviet Union was, but today’s EU lacks the political, economic and military wherewithal (to say nothing of the determination and will) to impose its European vision on Russia. This isn’t just about Vladimir Putin. No Russian leader could quietly accept the existing European architecture, which is a standing challenge to a range of Russia’s historic interests.
During the Cold War, European leaders prided themselves on possessing a more sophisticated and nuanced reading of Soviet intentions than the Americans, but over the past decade, they have been as slow as President Barack Obama and Secretary of StateJohn Kerry to grasp Russia’s intentions. On both sides of the Atlantic, leaders have been unable to understand that Mr. Putin sees the world through geopolitical, rather than liberal internationalist, spectacles. Mr. Putin has consistently outmaneuvered and outfoxed both the EU and the U.S. Even with its much weaker hand, Russia has forced NATO and the EU to conform to its movements and play the game on its terms.
President Charles De Gaulle and German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer leave the Cathedral in Reims, France, on July 8, 1962. PHOTO: KEYSTONE-FRANCE/GAMMA-RAPHO/GETTY IMAGES
A more credible European response to Russia would proceed on two fronts. In the first place, Europe must offer stiff resistance (from sanctions to security assistance) to Russian attempts to expand its influence and also reduce its own dependence on Russian energy. At the same time, however, Europe should open talks with Russia, inviting deeper participation in European institutions if (and only if) Russia moves closer to European values.
Another critical piece of the European legacy that the EU has discarded is the idea of the nation-state, one of the continent’s greatest and most powerful political inventions. The nation-state emerged as a way to bind millions of people together into a moral and political community, based on bonds of culture; it was meant to create solidarities and loyalties that could transcend regional and class divides.
The post-nationalist leaders of post-Cold War Europe thought that they would strengthen the continent by marginalizing nationalism and embracing the goal of a pan-European superstate. They were wrong, and the result of their error is visible today in the resurgence of nationalist tensions in reaction to the EU’s overreaching.
The original architects of European integration did not think that the nation-state was outmoded. For de Gaulle, Adenauer and De Gasperi, the nation-state (whatever its faults and limits) remained the indispensable foundation for European and world order. No other political entity possessed the necessary democratic legitimacy or effectiveness in action.
As de Gaulle would have predicted, a pan-European government conducted at a great remove from the peoples of Europe lacks the political support to be strong. Worse, it has lost sight of the importance of culture to policy-making, a failure that is visible, above all, in the single most disastrous European initiative since World War II: the euro.
Centuries of European history counseled against this experiment, but the proponents of the euro were technocrats who could only see the abstract logic of a single currency. They scoffed at the idea that money might play different roles across the continent’s varied cultures—roles that, as we have seen, could not be easily eradicated.
Germans tend to think of money as an objective measure of worth; they recoil at the notion that government would interfere with the value of money to achieve political or economic goals. For the Italians and the French, by contrast, monetary adjustment is the obvious way to handle economic problems and to redress social inequities. The euro ignored these (and many other) profound national differences. As a result, it has inflicted monumental economic pain on much of the continent. Administered by an unelected, transnational committee, it also has undermined public confidence in all of the EU’s institutions.
On migration, Europe has fumbled as badly as it has in managing its money. This is a colossal failure, brought about by a synthesis of cultural blindness and geopolitical fantasy.
Just as Europe’s leaders have discounted the geopolitical dimension of their relationship with Russia, so too they have ignored the gathering storms to their south and east. The combination of demographic explosion, authoritarianism and state failure in much of the Middle East, North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa ensures that wave after wave of desperate people will knock on Europe’s door for the foreseeable future. Syria is the tragedy of the moment, but developments in Turkey, Egypt, Pakistan and elsewhere could just as easily send new masses of refugees and migrants across the Mediterranean.
With anti-immigrant feeling growing across the continent, even as the wave of migrants threatens to grow, the EU is unable either to manage the flow or address its causes. Europeans are deeply and bitterly divided today about how to handle this unprecedented flow of refugees and migrants, but the problem isn’t going away.
Europe must regain control of its frontiers; its citizens must believe that their union can prevent an unending flow of migrants across the sea and over land. This means more naval power in the Mediterranean and expanded surveillance of Europe’s frontiers. It also means building up European hard-power capacities (including intelligence and military options) to better manage events in North Africa and the Middle East that affect vital European interests.
Taken together, these many challenges are formidable indeed, but the postwar architects of the continent’s union faced worse. The European tradition of statecraft and diplomacy developed in a world of ideological strife and bloody warfare. An intelligent return to that tradition offers Europeans a way forward. But it won’t be easy. Much of the European project as developed since the revolutions of 1989 needs to be rethought, and some of it needs to be dismantled.
In the first place, Europe must recover its traditional appreciation of hard power. No major European country spends anything like enough on defense. The bureaucratic-legalistic mind-set that now reigns in Brussels will have to be modified. In matters of diplomacy and security policy, today’s permanent European councils and parliaments will have to yield to more flexible arrangements based on the prerogatives of national governments.
To recover its élan and continental identity, Europe needs to stop pretending that history is over—that the stark old realities of international politics have given way to irresistible liberal progress. Europe must instead embrace the national states and cultures at its historic heart and exploit their creative power; it must rebuild its military capacities; and it must proceed with a clear-eyed focus on European interests in a dangerous world.
Such an EU—decentralized and outward-looking—might persuade British voters to reconsider Brexit. At a minimum, it would command Britain’s respect and draw it into deeper cooperation on military and political responses to the continuing crises to Europe’s east and south.
None of this will tear Europe apart or make it less European. Europe will become stronger even as it becomes truer to its own roots. De Gaulle called it a “Europe of fatherlands” (Europe des patries), and it will be more capable, respected and durable than the papier-mache facade of power that the bureaucrats and jurists have labored so industriously, but so vainly, to build in Brussels.
Mr. Mead is a distinguished fellow at the Hudson Institute in Washington, D.C., a professor of foreign affairs at Bard College and editor at large of the American Interest.
